University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1997

State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judicial Authority--Going
Where No Court Has Gone Before
Mark H. Zitzewitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zitzewitz, Mark H., "State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judicial Authority--Going Where No Court Has Gone Before" (1997). Minnesota Law
Review. 1892.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1892

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Comment
State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judicial Authority-Going
Where No Court Has Gone Before
Mark H. Zitzewitz*
Billy Jim Krotzer pled guilty to "statutory rape."1 Over the
prosecution's objections, the trial court refused to accept
Krotzer's plea, and, instead of sentencing Krotzer according to
statutory sentencing provisions, the court declared a stay of
adjudication and placed Krotzer on conditional probation.2 The
State of Minnesota appealed the trial court's disposition, arguing that it violated the separation of powers doctrine in the
Minnesota Constitution.3 Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that it was within the
court's inherent authority to act "in the furtherance of justice."4
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that holding, adding
that the "special circumstances" of Krotzer's case warranted
"unusual judicial measures."'
The decision in State v. Krotzer strayed from precedent re-6
garding the proper role of the judiciary in criminal trials.
Krotzer posed a single issue: whether a Minnesota court has
the authority to preclude prosecution of an individual by staying adjudication of the case because that court finds that the
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1993,
St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota.
1. State v. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), affd in
part, rev'd in part,548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996).
2. Id. at 865. In essence, a stay of adjudication acts as a diversion from
the trial process, offering a defendant the opportunity to fulfill courtdetermined conditions in exchange for dismissing charges before trial has begun3. Id.
4. Id. at 867.
5. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1996).
6. See infra notes 17-57 and accompanying text (detailing precedent regarding the role of each branch established by the separation of powers doctrine).

1049

1050

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1049

circumstances of the case warrant a disposition other than
those legislatively established. The holding extended judicial
that previously recognized by
discretion in sentencing beyond
7
courts.
other
and
Minnesota
This Comment will examine the holding of Krotzer and argue that the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota
Supreme Court erred in finding that inherent judicial powers
include the ability to stay adjudication of criminal prosecutions. Part I provides an overview of the separation of powers
doctrine and its application to the criminal trial process. 8 Part
II examines the holding and reasoning of both the Minnesota
Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Krotzer.
Part III critically analyzes the availability of a judicial stay of
adjudication in light of the constitutional separation of powers.
This Comment contends that the trial court's decision to stay
adjudication abridged the constitutional roles of both the legislature and the prosecutor. It further contends that the supreme court's holding established a standard which permits
unlimited judicial discretion in sentencing and sanctions judicial abuse of the legislature's proper role in making value
judgments in enacting the criminal code. Finally, this Comment recommends that, absent an overturning of Krotzer, the
legislature should regulate the availability of stays of adjudication in order to maintain the proper judicial, prosecutorial,
and legislative roles in the criminal justice system.
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
The federal and state constitutions divide the powers of governance into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
The Minnesota Constitution provides: 'The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to
or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of

7. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (detailing the extent of
judicial discretion in sentencing previously recognized by the courts).

8. Because Krotzer was a Minnesota case and the holding is unparalleled, the author cites primarily Minnesota case law. The issues dealt with in
Krotzer, however, are not unique to Minnesota. All state criminal courts face
the challenge of determining appropriate sentences in the context of a system
that allocates powers to each branch of the government and an environment
in which the public is increasingly critical of the criminal justice system. For
that reason, the author includes case law of other states and of the federal
courts.
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the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in
the instances expressly provided in this constitution." 9 Although the separation of powers arrangement appears rigid,
courts have generally refused to view the branches as "airtight
compartments," and instead have determined that the efficient
practice of governance requires a pragmatic, flexible application of the system. 10 As such, the "inherent powers" of the
branches often overlap and sometimes conflict.11
In order to function smoothly, the criminal justice system
requires a practical application of the separation of powers.
Generally, the state and federal constitutions charge the legislative branch with defining criminal offenses,12 empower the
executive to enforce the criminal code,13 and grant the judiciary
the authority to impose criminal sentences upon those convicted. 14 Enactment and enforcement of the criminal code ultimately achieves both retributivist and utilitarian purposes,
but when that code is ambiguous, the three branches claim
"inherent authority" and often disagree about how to attain
those goals.15 The constitution provides little guidance for the
proper handling of such cases, though each branch must obof authority therein to consistently
serve the distribution
16
achieve justice.
A. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The power to define criminal offenses and fix the punishment for proscribed acts is exclusively legislative. 17 In presid9. MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1.

10. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that the necessity of workable government "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity").
1. See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 414-15 (Wyo. 1990) (discussing the
checks and balances inherent in the system of overlapping authority).
12. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (describing the powers of

the legislature).
13. See infra notes 22-45 and accompanying text (describing the powers of
the executive, or prosecutor).
14 See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (describing the powers of

the courts).
15. See, e.g., infra note 48 (describing the procedural checks involved in a

judicial dismissal in the furtherance ofjustice).
16. See, e.g., In re Clerk of Lyon County, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn.
1976) (noting that the coures inherent remedial authority is subordinate to

constitutional demands).
17. Ex ParteUnited States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); State v. Osterloh, 275
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ing over the adjudication of criminal complaints, the courts
must observe the legislature's policy decisions that lie behind
the criminal code." It is the legislature's duty to prescribe
criminal penalties and thus direct the courts' imposition of sentences. 9 Indeed, some states, including Minnesota, as well as
the federal justice system have established sentencing guidelines from which a court may stray only under prescribed conditions. 20 The imposition of sentencing guidelines and similar
measures reflects the general trend toward confining judicial
sentencing discretion, as Congress and state legislatures respond to public pressure and sentiment that criminals get their
N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978); State v. Meyer, 37 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Minn. 1949);
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 415 (Wyo. 1990).
18. See Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. at 42 (noting that a "discretionary
authority [of the judiciary] to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought not
to be treated as criminal... would result in the destruction of the conceded
powers of the other departments and hence leave no law to be enforced");
Meyer, 37 N.W.2d at 10 ("It is the exclusive province of the Legislature to declare what acts, deemed by the lawmakers... shall constitute a crime, to
prohibit the same and impose appropriate penalties for a violation thereof.
With the wisdom and propriety thereof the courts are not concerned.")
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. 345, 346 (Minn. 1918));
see also Billis, 800 P.2d at 416 ("The judicial department has no inherent
power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to execute
such a sentence when imposed ....
That power belongs exclusively to the
legislative department.").
19. State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 1982); Meyer, 37 N.W.2d at
15; State v. Pierce, 657 A.2d 192, 195 (Vt. 1995).
20. See, e.g., Deb Dailey, Introduction and Background to MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY ANNOTATED (Deb Dailey ed., 2d
ed. 1995) (noting that the sentencing structure that existed prior to the establishment of sentencing guidelines was indeterminate, allowing broad judicial
discretion to impose a sentence within a range of zero years to the statutory
maximum). In 1978, the state legislature established a Sentencing Guidelines
Commission to establish guidelines for the district court in sentencing felons.
Id. The Commission established a determinate sentencing structure that
employs a grid system, placing each individual offense in a cell on the grid
based on its severity and on the offender's criminal history. Id. Judges may
depart from the presumed sentence established by the Guidelines only when
they note, in writing, established social factors that are "substantial and compelling" in the individual's case. MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES § H.D (1996). The
guidelines do not guide the decision to stay imposition or execution of sentences, however. Id. § II.A.2. The sentencing court has the option of staying
imposition or execution after a finding of guilt. MINN. STAT. § 609.135, subd.
1 (1994); State v. Oka, 356 N.W.2d 676, 677 (Minn. 1984). An overwhelming
majority of state and federal courts has held that a disposition of a stay of
execution or imposition is within the power granted the courts by statute, not
that the option is within "inherent judicial powers." Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d at
580.
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"just desserts."2 1 The federal and state constitutions empower
solely the democratic legislative branch to categorize behavior
as "criminal" and to determine the extent to which the State
will impose penalties for such actions.
B. ExEcuTIVE AUTHORITY
The executive branch enforces the criminal code that the
legislature adopts. In the context of the criminal justice system, the executive branch has the constitutional prerogative to
decide to bring charges,' to dismiss charges once brought, 23 to
plea bargain,24 and to recommend a sentence to the court.25
The prosecutor, as an agent of the executive branch, exercises this authority in making the decision to bring specific
26
charges against individuals through criminal complaints,
with established procedural checks providing the only limit to
his or her authority. 7 Prosecutors have considerable discre-

21. "The purpose of the [Minnesota] sentencing guidelines is to establish
rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional
to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender's
criminal history." MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES § I (1996). "The policy emphasizes the sentencing goal of just desserts or retribution for the crime committed and de-emphasizes utilitarian sentencing goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation." Dailey, supra note 20.
The federal guidelines, which used the Minnesota Guidelines as a model,
were a product of widespread dissatisfaction with the judicial discretion afforded by indeterminate sentencing, and significantly limited judicial discretion in sentencing while greatly enhancing the power of the prosecutor. Jack
H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor'sNew Clothes:Due Process ConsiderationsUnder
the FederalSentencing Guidelines,60 TENN. L. REV. 467,487,496 (1993).
22. See infra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the power to
bring charges).
23. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the power to
suspend charges).
24. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecutor's
authority to plea bargain).
25. See State v. Pierce, 657 A.2d 192, 195 (Vt. 1995) ("The prosecutor determines the extent of a suspect's sentencing exposure by deciding whether
and what charges will be brought, whether to plea bargain, and what sentence
to recommend.").
26. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.02; State v. Aubol, 244 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn.
1976) (per curiam).
27. See State v. Smith, 270 N.W.2d 122, 124 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam)
(noting that prosecutorial discretion is subject to the establishment of probable cause) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). In addition to the
establishment of probable cause, about half of the states and the federal system require that a grand jury approve a felony charge unless the defendant
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tion in the charging decision, subject only to the limitations of
abuse,2 8 due process,29 and equal protection. 30 Absent statutory
or constitutional abridgment, the state has a "right to one full
and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its
laws." 31 Beyond the enforcement of procedural limitations,
the
32
court cannot evaluate the propriety of criminal charges.
has waived that right. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JAROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL
PROCEDURE § 13.1(a), at 157 (1984).
The decision to prosecute and the choice of what charges to file and
against whom rest entirely within the prosecutor's discretion. See Smith, 270
N.W.2d at 124 (following the Supreme Court's establishment of the scope of
prosecutorial discretion established in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364 (1978)); State v. Billis, 800 P.2d 401, 417 (Wyo. 1990) (noting that the
'prosecutor's power to dismiss charges, to reduce charges, to defer charges, in
sum to control the prosecution, was exclusive").
28. See Aubol, 244 N.W.2d at 639 (citing United States v. Ammidown, 497
F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), in which the court noted, "The question is not
what the judge would do if he were the prosecuting attorney, but whether he
can say that the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from
sound prosecutorial principle as to mark an abuse of prosecutorial discretion".
Minnesota courts have evaluated charging decisions for prosecutorial
abuse in a variety of contexts. See State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817-18,
820 (Minn. 1993) (evaluating abuse in the execution of the indictment and
trial processes); State v. Alexander, 290 N.W.2d 745, 748-49 (Minn. 1980)
(examining a charging decision for vindictiveness); Smith, 270 N.W.2d at 124
(determining whether charging decisions were race-based).
29. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65 (holding that a charging decision did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution when it was
based on probable cause and was not deliberately arbitrary); Smith, 270
N.W.2d at 164 (applying the Bordenkircher test to a challenge under the Minnesota Constitution's due process clause).
30. See, e.g., State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn. 1980) ("As a
general rule, the prosecutor's decision whom to prosecute and what charges to
file is a discretionary matter which is not subject to judicial review absent
proof by defendant of deliberate discrimination based on some unjustifiable
standard such as race, sex, or religion.").
31. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984) (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
32. See Aubol, 244 N.W.2d at 640 (holding that under the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the constitutional separation of powers, the
judiciary must refrain from undue interference with the direction taken by
the prosecution in bringing criminal charges). The Aubol court noted:
As to fairness to the prosecution interest, here we have a matter in
which the primary responsibility, obviously, is that of the prosecuting
attorney. The District Court cannot disapprove of his action on the
ground of incompatibility with prosecutorial responsibility unless the
judge is in effect ruling that the prosecutor has abused his discretion.
Id. at 639 (citation omitted); see also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479,
480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Newman court wrote succinctly of proper judicial
restraint, noting, "Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the
exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding whether to institute
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power to
The prosecutor also has virtually unconstrained
33 Though
permanently or temporarily suspend prosecution.
the court may dismiss a charge "in the furtherance of justice" 34
or upon finding a lack of probable cause, 35 absent such a finding, it may not defeat a prosecution or accept a plea to a lesser
charge without the prosecutor's consent. 36 Until jeopardy attaches, therefore, a court's dismissal on procedural grounds is
without prejudice, allowing the prosecutor to reinstate charges
criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to
dismiss a proceeding once brought." Id.
33. MINN. STAT. § 609.132 (1994); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 30.01; see Aubol, 244
N.W.2d at 640 (holding that the Rules require a trial court to grant leave to
dismiss upon motion by the prosecutor unless the court explicitly finds that
such motion constitutes an abuse of discretion); see also Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 574 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Mass. 1991) (stating that the decision to terminate prosecution is within the discretion of the prosecutor and is free from
judicial intervention); State v. Clark, 469 N.W.2d 871, 873 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that "[tlhe authority to seek dismissal, with or without prejudice, except in cases of statutory or constitutional authorization, rests in the
discretion of the prosecutor"); State v. Billis, 800 P.2d 401, 418 (Wyo. 1990)
(noting that the power to terminate prosecution is exclusively allocated to the
executive branch).
34. MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (1994); see infra notes 37, 48 (describing application of the statute).
35. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.04, subd. 1. But see State v. Aarsvold, 376
N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that a dismissal for lack of
probable cause after suppressing evidence was appealable where it effectively
precluded the prosecution from reissuing an amended complaint).
36. See generally State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1980) (examining
the courts authority under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.07,
which authorizes the court to permit the defendant on motion to plead to a
lesser offense). The Carrierecourt found that the comment to Rule 15.07 expressly authorized the court to accept such a plea without consent of the
prosecutor, but the court held that such an application would violate the separation of powers arrangement which gives the prosecutor discretion in charging criminal offenses. Id. at 620. The court further held that the prosecution
can defeat such a motion by showing a "reasonable likelihood the state can
withstand a motion to dismiss the charge at the close of the state's case in
chief." Id.; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984) (holding that
the trial court's dismissal of a murder indictment after accepting a guilty plea
to involuntary manslaughter was improper because it denied the prosecution
an opportunity to exercise its constitutional power to prosecute violators of
the laws); Gordon, 574 N.E.2d at 976 (holding that the trial court's decision to
accept, over the prosecutor's objection, the defendant's guilty plea to seconddegree murder when he had been indicted for first-degree murder usurped the
decision-making authority constitutionally reserved for the prosecutor); cf.
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790-96 (1977) (holding that the judgment of when to bring an indictment was within the discretion of the prosecutor); Commonwealth v. Kindness, 371 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Pa. 1977) (holding that
"a Pennsylvania court has the power to dismiss a prosecution over the prosecuting attorney's objection only when the legislature expressly empowers it to
do so").
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through an amended complaint.3 7 Thus, the state and federal
constitutions limit the decision to dismiss charges, just as they
limit the decision to bring charges, but the prosecutor maintains broad discretion.
As an extension of the power to control the charges filed
against a defendant, the prosecutor has the exclusive authority
to enter into a plea agreement with the defense.3 8 The discretion to plea bargain is necessarily quite broad, and the prosecutor, as part of the negotiation, can threaten to bring additional charges against a defendant as long as he or she can
show probable cause.39 Indeed, the prosecutor has no duty to
enter into plea bargaining at all.4 ° Overall, the process of plea
bargaining is the province of the prosecutor, and courts have
no authority to interfere by entering into plea bargains on the
State's behalf without the prosecutor's consent.4 1
A final extension of the prosecutor's authority to press
criminal charges is the power to "recommend" a sentence to the
court by selectively charging individuals under statutes that

37. See City of St. Paul v. Landreville, 221 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn. 1974)
(per curiam). A court's finding that further prosecution would violate the defendant's constitutional rights bars the prosecutor from charging the same
offense. Id.; see also Village of Eden Prairie v. Housman, 180 N.W.2d 251, 252
(Minn. 1970) (per curiam) (holding that a dismissal for "want of prosecution"
is without prejudice); cf. City of St. Paul v. Halvorson, 221 N.W.2d 535, 537
(Minn. 1974) (holding that a violation of due process justifies a dismissal with
prejudice, but that under other circumstances, the state may reinstate
charges after a dismissal by the court).
38. See State v. Vahabi, 529 N.W.2d 359, 360-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
see also Gordon, 574 N.E.2d at 976 & n.3 (noting that plea bargaining is constitutionally allocated to the prosecutor and judges are not to actively participate); Carriere,290 N.W.2d at 620 n.3 (stating that the decision to engage in
plea bargaining is at the prosecutor's discretion).
39. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (holding that
the threat in plea bargaining to charge the defendant under the Kentucky recidivist statute "no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was
plainly subject to prosecution, [and] did not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment").
40. See State v. Andrews, 165 N.W.2d 528, 532 n.4 (Minn. 1969).
41. See, e.g., Vahabi, 529 N.W.2d at 360-61 (noting that trial judges
should not "improperly inject" themselves into plea negotiations) (citation
omitted); see also State v. Johnson, 156 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1968) (noting
that the role of the trial judge in the plea negotiation process is limited to a
"discreet inquiry into the propriety of the settlement submitted for judicial
acceptance"); State v. Todd, 570 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(upholding a New Jersey statute that prohibits courts from imposing a lesser
sentence than the one the parties agreed to in a plea bargain).
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change the possible punishment upon conviction. For instance,
the decision to try a juvenile in adult court is generally within
the prosecutor's discretion.42 Likewise, the prosecutor may
seek to charge an individual under a "repeat offender" statute
that imposes significantly harsher penalties on recidivist
criminals. 43 Many states allow the prosecutor to choose pretrial diversion as an alternative to going forward with or
dropping a complaint.44 The charging power under these
"special" statutes grants discretion to prosecutors that is quite

42. See Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that "[iun light of our previous holding that juvenile treatment is a creation of
state legislatures, we find no federal constitutional infirmity in permitting
state prosecutors to employ their discretion to seek indictments against those
juveniles who have allegedly committed serious crimes"); Russell v. Parratt,
543 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in trying a 17-year-old as an adult did not violate due process);
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that the
discretion afforded prosecutors under a statute allowing adult prosecution for
offenders 16 years of age or older does not violate due process or equal protection); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 938 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (holding
that Colorado's statute allowing criminal trials for defendants 14 and older
prohibited the court from intervening in the prosecutor's decision to try a 16year-old as an adult).
43. See, e.g., People v. San Diego County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
364, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding California's "Three Strikes" law
which enhanced penalties for recidivist defendants). The California "Three
Strikes" statute expressly provided that courts could not strike prior convictions from a defendant's record in order to avoid the law's edict, but allowed
prosecutors to strike prior convictions "in furtherance of justice." Id. The
court held that the statute's allowance of prosecutorial discretion was proper
under the separation of powers clause of the state constitution. Id. The California Supreme Court upheld the decision. 892 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1995).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld Nebraska's
"habitual criminal statute," NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1993), against repeated challenges. See Pierce v. Parratt, 666 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1981)
(upholding the statute against a challenge that it delegated to the prosecutor
the legislative responsibility to define criminal conduct); Brown v. Parratt,
560 F.2d 303, 304 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that the statute does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment); Martin v. Parratt, 549 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir.
1977) (finding that the statute does not violate the principles of due process or
equal protection).
44. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 13.1(d), at 158-59. "Diversion 'is
the disposition of a criminal complaint without a conviction, the noncriminal
disposition being conditioned on either the performance of specified obligations by the defendant, or his participation in counselling [sic] or treatment.'"
Id. at 159 (citation omitted).
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broad, bounded only by4 5the constitutional limit forbidding purposeful discrimination.
C. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Though the separation of powers often restricts its discretion, the judiciary is far from a passive spectator in the process
of criminal justice. Once the State brings criminal charges, the
court has the authority to accept or reject a plea,46 including
one arrived at through negotiation between the prosecutor and
defendant.4 7 Furthermore, the court has the power to dismiss a
complaint sua sponte in the "furtherance of justice" or upon the
determination of a constitutional violation.4 8 As noted earlier,
the court may not deny the State a full and fair opportunity to
prosecute a defendant, but it maintains a ministerial
role in
49
determining the propriety of the proceedings.

45. See, e.g., Bland, 472 F.2d at 1337 (noting that the general due process
requirement is that a charging decision need not be based on "suspect" factors, such as "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification").
46. See supra note 36 (explaining the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling
in Carriere,which examined the court's authority to accept a plea to a lesser
crime than that charged); see also State v. Tuttle, 504 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (noting that Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.05
grants courts the discretion to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if it is "fair and just" to do so). Under Minnesota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 15.04, subdivision 3(1), a court has the authority to reserve acceptance of a guilty plea pending completion of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI), but cannot allow a defendant to subsequently withdraw the plea.
Turtle, 504 N.W.2d. at 257.
47. See supra notes 41, 46 and accompanying text (describing the limited
role of a court in the plea bargaining process); see also State v. Moe, 479
N.W.2d 427, 429 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (describing the court's role as that of
an "independent examiner to verify that the defendant's plea is the result of
an intelligent and knowing choice and not based on misapprehension or the
product of coercion") (citation omitted).
48. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (detailing cases in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a court's dismissal in furtherance of justice or on constitutional grounds may be proper under Minnesota statutes and
rules but is presumed without prejudice); see also State v. Hendrickson, 395
N.W.2d 458, 461 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the court's dismissal "in
the furtherance of justice" did not prevent the State from reissuing the complaint); In re Welfare of J.H.C., 384 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that dismissal in the furtherance of justice was authorized by Minnesota Statute § 631.21 (1984), but that such an action was not a final order of
the court precluding further state action on the charge).
49. See supra note 28 (discussing a court's holding that a trial court need
not accept a motion by the prosecutor to dismiss a case but that the trial court
must explicitly identify its reasons for refusing to grant leave to dismiss a
complaint).
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The court's primary role comes in the final disposition of a
case.50 The court has the exclusive authority to impose criminal sanctions, though statutory mandates limit the scope of its
power. 5 1 In a determinate sentencing scheme, the court maintains the limited power to depart from a presumptive sentence
to ensure that the punishment imposed fits the circumstances
of the crime committed. 2 It also has the discretion to stay execution or imposition of a sentence if a statute authorizes such a
disposition.5 3 Additionally, most states have statutes granting
courts some authority to expunge criminal records. 4 Though
50. See People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) ("When
the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal
or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.").
5L See State v. Billis, 800 P.2d 401, 416 (Wyo, 1990) (finding that "[tihe
judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence
fixed by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed").
52. See supra note 20 (discussing the use of sentencing guidelines and the
judicial power to depart from those guidelines). States are divided on whether
courts may, without consent of the prosecutor, impose a sentence below the
statutory minimum established for offenses. Cases holding that the judiciary
has such authority include: State v. Jones, 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984);
People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1972); Brugman v. State, 339 S.E.2d 244
(Ga. 1986); and State v. LeCompte, 406 So. 2d 1300 (La. 1981).
Cases which upheld statutes requiring prosecutorial recommendation in
order for courts to impose a sentence which is less than the statutory minimum include: United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1989); Eldridge v.
State, 418 So. 2d 203 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982); People v. DistrictCourt, 101 P.2d 26
(Colo. 1940); State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981); and People v. Eason,
353 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1976).
53. See supra note 20 (discussing stays of imposition and execution of
sentences). Furthermore, courts have inherent power to suspend sentencing
while awaiting the determination of a rule of law or a finding of fact regarding
specific circumstances of the case at hand. Ex ParteUnited States, 242 U.S.
27, 30 (1916). This power is limited, however, because "[alrbitrary, capricious
or indefinite suspension ... destroys the due administration of the law, and
transcends all inherent power." Id. A permanent suspension, the Court held,
is the equivalent of a pardon-a power reserved solely for the executive. Id.
at 42.
54. See, e.g., State v. Ranthum, No. C9-95-2642, 1996 WL 422520, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (examining the authority of Minnesota courts to expunge criminal records). Minnesota Statute section 2990.11 authorizes expungement of records of criminal proceedings after 10 years if those proceedings turn out in favor of the accused. The Ranthum court noted that courts
have the inherent authority to expunge records to prevent the infringement of
constitutional rights or if such action is "'necessary to the performance of the
judicial function as contemplated in our state constitution.'" Ranthum, 1996
WL 422520, at *2 (citation omitted); see also In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803,
807-08 (Minn. 1977) (holding that the court's equity powers enable the power
of expungement when the record indicates serious infringement of constitutional rights).
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the role of sentencing is exclusively judicial, the discretion exercised in sentencing is statutory, and courts must obey the
legislatively imposed limits.
The courts also have "inherent powers" that arise from the
judiciary's historic powers of equity and its oversight role in
the courtroom." By necessity, the court must be able to control
the proceedings within its arena. 6 Courts may invoke their
inherent powers where no statutory limits exist. Nonetheless,
the scope of such authority is controversial." In these situations, the courts must balance the need for humane administration of justice in each individual criminal case with their
restricted role within the separation of powers doctrine.
II. STATE V. KROTZER
Billy Jim Krotzer stood before Judge Philip Kanning, of
the First Judicial District, charged with criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. 8 Then nineteen years old, Krotzer
55. See Lyon County, 241 N.W.2d at 784 (explaining the courtes inherent
powers). The Lyon County court found, "Inherent judicial power governs that
which is essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a
court." Id.; see also State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982) ("'[T]he
inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself; the power to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not;
the power to promulgate rules for its practice; and the power to provide process where none exists.'") (citation omitted).
56. See, e.g., In re Death of VanSlooten, 424 N.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding that "courts do have authority over executive officials
in the exercise of purely ministerial fimctions," in holding that the trial court
had the power to suppress items found in a search because a search warrant
is subject to the direction of the court).
57. See Lyon County, 241 N.W.2d at 784 (noting that the scope of inherent
judicial power "is the practical necessity of ensuring the free and full exercise
of the courtes vital function-the disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs and... Justice conformable to the laws'") (citation omitted).
The Lyon County court further noted that a court cannot exercise inherent
judicial authority in the face of constitutional provisions granting power to the
legislative branch. Id.
The New Jersey courts have taken a particularly broad view of the extent
of judicial discretion. See, e.g., State v. Abbati, 493 A-2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1985)
(noting that "the judicial power imports the power to fashion needed and appropriate remedies," in upholding the power to dismiss an indictment with
prejudice after two trials on the same indictment resulted in deadlocked juries); State v. Farquharson, 655 A.2d 84, 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(finding that "the inherent power of the court to fashion needed and appropriate remedies to meet particular circumstances is without question and is as
expansive as the need and circumstances require").
58. Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Third Degree is defined in Minnesota
Statute section 609.344, subdivision 1(b) (1994).
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had admitted to having sexual intercourse with fourteen-yearold C.H.M. 59 The Carver County prosecutor charged Krotzer
with "statutory rape," a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years and/or a fine of not more
than $30,000.60 Additionally, the State must register any person convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct as a
"predatory sex offender."61 After the parties failed to reach a
plea agreement, Krotzer pleaded guilty to the crime charged. 62
Without formally accepting the plea,63 the district court
ordered the Department of Corrections to perform a presentence investigation (PSI).' The PSI recommended that the
district court "stay adjudication" of the matter and place
Krotzer on probation for up to five years. 65 Based on this rec-

59. State v. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996). According to the facts detailed by the court of appeals, Krotzer and C.H.M. had been dating and had
engaged in sexual intercourse at least twice. The girrs mother subsequently
learned of the relationship and set strict rules that they no longer have sexual
relations. The couple then decided to cease the sexual relationship. Id.
The police learned of the relationship not from the mother, but from an
unnamed party's tip. Id. In a subsequent investigation, the Chaska Police
Department interviewed the couple at which time they admitted to having
had sexual intercourse. Id. The court found, "Neither the so-called victim nor
her family had any intention of criminally implicating Krotzer. The record
shows it was a consensual, though unacceptable, relationship between two
dating teenagers." Id. at 867.
The Minnesota Supreme Court found it particularly noteworthy that the
parties reached an "amicable resolution of the situation" prior to the State's
intervention. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 253 (Minn. 1996). The court
noted that the girl's mother opposed Krotzer's prosecution and asked the district court in a letter to "let it end." Id. at 253 n.2. The girl's mother also told
the court at the sentencing hearing that she had "given [her] blessing to this
relationship." Id.
60. MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. 2 (1994).
61. Id. § 243.166. The statute requires that a person convicted of criminal sexual conduct must register with corrections and law enforcement
authorities each time he or she changes residences for 10 years and provide to
those officials a statement of his or her offense, a photograph and a fingerprint card. Failure to do so is a gross misdemeanor. Id.
62. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 864.
63. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 253. The trial judge told Krotzer that if "this
matter does not conclude as we expect it will, then you have a right to withdraw the plea and the State would then have to prove the case and you would
be entitled to a jury trial." Id.
64. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 864.
65. Id. The Department's report noted that the law required Krotzer to
register as a predatory sex offender despite a lack of aggressiveness in his
case and found him to be amenable to counseling. Id.
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ommendation and over the prosecutor's objection, the court
then stayed adjudication. 66 The court placed Krotzer on probation for sixty months, conditioned on his serving sixty days
in the workhouse, paying fees and fines totaling about $615
and "remain[ing] law abiding."67 The prosecutor objected and
requested that the court accept the guilty plea and impose the
presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.6 8 The district court declined the prosecutor's recommendation, though the court was uncertain of the propriety of its
disposition and invited the prosecutor to appeal in order to
have a higher court determine if a stay69of adjudication was an
available and proper sentencing option.
The State appealed the district court's disposition, and the
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld it as an exercise of inherent judicial authority. 70 The court found that the judiciary had
the power to dismiss criminal cases for lack of probable cause,
in the furtherance of justice, or upon judgment of acquittal at
the close of either side's case. 71 It further noted that the judiciary had inherent power in the governance of "its own operations" and in the "'exercise of the court's vital function-the disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs.' "72
Such inherent authority, the court reasoned, necessarily implied the lesser power of imposing a stay of adjudication. 73
The court of appeals reasoned by analogy in equating a
stay of adjudication with a continuance for dismissal74 and

66. Id. at 865.
67. Id. The fees included $200 to the public defender's fund, a $115 surcharge, and an unspecified payment for his sex offender assessment at Alpha
Human Services. Id. The fine imposed was $300. Id. The court also required
that Krotzer's visits with C.H.M. or any other female under age 16 be supervised. Id.
68. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 253. For a defendant with a criminal history
score of zero, as was the case with Krotzer, the Guidelines call for an 18month stay of imposition. MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES § IV (1996).
69. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 253.
70. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 867.
7L Id. at 865.
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. Id. The court found, "The stay of adjudication is less than outright
dismissal because the court retains jurisdiction through conditions imposed on
the stay." Id.
74. Id. The court noted:
[Inherent in that power to dismiss is the right to postpone. Put another way, the judge's power to dismiss can be exercised on the spot
or the trial court can say, I will make the dismissal effective next
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stated that the sentence was a proper diversion from the trial
process. 75 Moreover, the court found that, because the district
court had not yet formally accepted Krotzer's guilty plea, it had
not yet reached the point of sentencing and thus could stay
adjudication.7 6 The court ultimately held that "[s]tays of adjurecord are
dication to protect a citizen from a formal criminal
77
court."
district
a
of
power
within the inherent
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision.78 The court held that the decision of the trial
court did not interfere with the executive's power to prosecute,
because the case had reached the point of disposition-the exclusive realm of the judiciary.7 9 Additionally, the court noted
that the "special circumstances of Krotzer's case" warranted

week or next month. That is the essence of a continuance for dismissal or a stay of adjudication.

Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
75. Id. The court noted that courts may, in some instances, divert a case
from the trial process. It then chastised the prosecution for bringing the matter within the trial process, noting:
It is unfortunate that appellant State has put the trial court in this
position... [Ilt would be overkill for the court to formally accept a
plea of guilty even if it then went on to stay imposition of sentence or
stay execution of sentence, as under the letter of the law, the young
man would be registered for life as a predatory sex offender, despite
his withdrawal from the relationship.... Krotzer did not deserve
that label. The probation officer saw that, the trial court saw that,
the family of the alleged victim saw that. Only the state saw fit to
appeal a sentence on a fact situation which arguably could have been
handled with complete diversion outside the criminal process from
the outset.
Id. at 867.
76. Id. at 866. But cf. State v. Boyd, No. C5-93-902, 1993 WL 319080, at
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1993). In Boyd, the court held that a stay of adjudication was a disposition not authorized by the legislature. Id. at *2. In
Krotzer, the court of appeals distinguished Boyd because in that case the trial
court had formally accepted the defendant's guilty plea, and, as such, "there
was nothing left for the district court to do other than pronouncing sentence."
531 N.W.2d at 866. In contrast, the Krotzer court reasoned, the trial court in
the instant case "reservedthe formal adjudication of a guilty plea." Id.
77. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 867.
78. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 256. Regarding the imposition of a jail sentence as a condition of probation, the court held that the 60-day sentence levied by the trial court was a proper exercise of judicial authority. Id. In justifying such a condition, the court pointed out that it would have been
authorized by Minnesota Statute § 152.18, which authorizes a stay of adjudication in some drug cases. Id. Though that statute was inapplicable in this
case, the court reasoned that the discretion it afforded in staying adjudication
did apply. Id.
79. Id. at 254.
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the employment of "unusual judicial measures."" The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a stay of adjudication was an exercise of inherent judicial authority that was necessary to the
furtherance of justice,81 though it acknowledged that no Minnesota statute or rule supported such an action.8 2 The court
noted that a dismissal by the trial court would have allowed
the prosecutor to reinstate the charges, 83and found that a stay
of adjudication "avoid[ed] this dilemma."
80. Id.
81. Id. at 255. The court held that a stay of adjudication was akin to a
dismissal in the furtherance ofjustice, as authorized under Minnesota Statute
section 631.21. Id.
82. Id. at 254. In a footnote, the court acknowledged that Krotzer's case
did not fit under Minnesota Statute section 152.18, which permits a court to
stay adjudication in prosecutions of certain drug offenses. Id. at 254 n.3. The
court further noted that a stay of adjudication was not among the available
sentences for conviction of a felony nor under the statute which permits stays
of imposition or execution in come cases. Id. The court found, however, that
none of these statutes applied in this case, as Krotzer's guilty plea had never
been accepted by the court. Id.
83. Id. at 255. Three justices of the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed.
Justice Coyne issued a strongly worded dissent in which she rebuked the
court for making "bad law." Id. at 256 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Justice Coyne
noted that statutory rape was a long-established offense that represented a
policy decision by the legislature. Id. "This court," she admonished, "is not a
law unto itself." She continued, "Invoking a court's 'inherent judicial authority' to obtain a result that this court likes in this case is tantamount to saying
that a court can do anything it wants to do." Id.
Justice Coyne further added that courts do not have inherent authority to
accept a plea to a lesser offense without the prosecutor's agreement, nor can
they defeat all avenues of prosecution by dismissal in the furtherance of justice. Id. at 259. She concluded that the separation of powers doctrine did not
allow the judiciary to employ a stay of adjudication as a diversion from the
trial process in a manner which denied the executive branch an opportunity to
prosecute. Id. Justice Coyne found:
While the arguments are strong that the prosecutor in this case perhaps should not have filed the charge in the first place and that it
might have been prudent for the prosecutor to agree to the diversion
requested by the trial court, I do not think that the trial court had
the power or the authority to order the diversion over the prosecutor's objection.
Id.
Justice TomIjanovich joined Justice Coyne's dissent and reminded the
court that the majority's decision failed to enforce a law which the legislature
enacted to protect young victims. Id. at 260 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
Justice Tomljanovich noted that a stay of adjudication was not an available
disposition in this case, and she concluded that, though some instances warrant judicial discretion, "when judicial discretion conflicts with the constitutional separation of powers, separation of powers wins," and that "[tihe majority has permitted the courts to encroach into an area reserved to the executive
branch by the constitution." Id.
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III. KROTZER: AN ANALYSIS OF INHERENT
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
The majority in Krotzer found the State's separation of
powers argument unconvincing. 4 In finding that a stay of adjudication was a proper though "unusual" exercise of "inherent
judicial authority," the majority strayed from Minnesota precedent, as well as that accepted by other state and federal courts,
and trampled upon the powers vested in the legislative and executive branches. 85 Furthermore, by holding that the "special
circumstances" of Krotzer's case warranted a stay of adjudication, the court established a standard that has led to further
86
Alabuse of the separation of powers in subsequent cases.
though the disposition of criminal cases should address the
particular facts of each case, it is the legislature's exclusive
right to define the limits of judicial discretion in sentencing,
especially when that discretion forecloses the prosecution's opportunity to see the case through to its desired end. 7 Absent
such legislative approval, a stay of adjudication was not an appropriate disposition in Krotzer, and the decision should be
overturned.
A. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS REVISITED: STAY OF
ADJUDICATION AND STATUTORY JUDICIAL DISCRETION

1. Legislative Authority to Limit Judicial Considerations
The Minnesota legislature defined the act of sexual penetration of a child under age sixteen by someone more than
forty-eight months older as criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree.8 8 As such, the admitted acts committed by Billy
Jim Krotzer were criminal and punishable by law.89 The trial

84. See id. at 254 (finding that the prosecutor's powers were not impeded

by the decision to stay adjudication).
85. See supra notes 17-57 and accompanying text (detailing precedent regarding the roles of each branch).
86. See infra notes 154-165 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which Krotzer has been applied).
87. See infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text (describing the legislative role and the need for legislative action in light of Krotzer).
88. MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (1994).
89. See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 37 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Mim. 1989) ("It is the exclusive province of the Legislature to declare what acts, deemed by the lawmakers... shall constitute a crime, to prohibit the same and impose appropriate penalties for a violation thereof.'") (citation omitted).
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court gave undue consideration to.both the fact that the victim's mother did not deem these acts worthy of criminal punishment and to the harshness of the penalties faced by Krotzer.
In the criminal justice system, the judgments of the court and a
peripheral party as to the propriety of criminal laws is subordinate to that of the legislature, which the Minnesota Constitution charges with establishing, through democratic means,
the standard of allowable behavior. 90 That the court of appeals
referred to C.H.M. as a "so-called victim"91 was unfortunate, if
not demeaning, and the repeated reference to the couple's sexual relationship as "consensual" ignored the plain language of
the statute, which specifically establishes that a fourteen-yearold is incapable of such consent.2 The court's framing of the
illegal acts within a context of a continuing relationship and its
desire to see it handled within the family unit may have been
suitable sentiments, but such feelings cannot overshadow the
legislature's constitutional prerogative of defining criminal
acts.
The penalties Krotzer faced were indeed harsh, as the
State would have required him to be registered as a sex offender even though he lacked the violent or predatory nature
generally associated with such a label.93 To infer that the legislature disregarded such a consequence, however, disrespects
the legislative process and improperly injects judicial opinion

90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing cases which have
held that the decision to deem specific acts criminal is outside the purview of
the judiciary). C.H.M.'s mother, upon learning of the illegal acts, had two
available options: to seek prosecution, or to not seek prosecution. That prosecution was sought without her assent does not grant her the authority to defeat a valid prosecution. Her objection to the law may be taken up with the
legislature, not with the court.
91. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 867.
92. See MIN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (establishing that consent is not
an available defense under the statute with which Krotzer was charged); see
also Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 256 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Justice Coyne appropriately noted:
The crime is based on recognition of the fact that young girls and
boys lack both the judgment and the understanding of the possible
long-term consequences of their actions so that they are incapable of
giving meaningful consent to sexual intercourse. That the erosion of
the deep shame and embarrassment formerly associated with out-ofwedlock pregnancies of young girls may have resulted in somewhat
sporadic enforcement does not make the crime any less a crime.

Id.
93. See Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 867 (calling the treatment of Krotzer
"overkill").
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into that legislative function. 94 Recognizing that youthful offenders may deserve a second chance, the legislature granted
judicial authority to set aside a guilty verdict five years after
service of the penalty imposed. 5 The legislature also granted
expungement power to the court, though it is doubtful that
such an outcome would be available in Krotzer's case. 96 Beyond the remedies specifically made available by statute, the
court was powerless to unilaterally impose
its own value judg97
ment over that of the state legislature.
2. The Court's Failure to Justify Its Holding
The court cannot justify a stay of adjudication in the face
of existing Minnesota statutes. Once defined as a criminal act,
Krotzer's behavior and admission of guilt allowed the State to
seek punishment as it saw fit.9" Under Minnesota statutes, the

94. See supra note 18 (noting that courts should not be concerned with
the "wisdom and propriety" of legislative choices in establishing the criminal
code).
95. Minnesota Statute § 609.166 (1994) allows a court to set aside a guilty
verdict when the defendant was under 21 years old when he or she committed
a crime not punishable by life imprisonment so long as he or she has not been
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor in the five years following completion of
the sentence.
96. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the expungement statute). Krotzer could petition for expungement of the conviction in 10
years, but it is doubtful that the court would find that the outcome of his trial
was in his favor or infringed upon his constitutional rights.
97. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (finding that
"Ojudges are not free, in defining 'due process,' to impose on law enforcement
officials our 'personal and private notions' of fairness and to 'disregard the
limits that bind judges in their judicial function.'") (citation omitted); Ex Parte
United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (noting that judicial refusal to treat a
criminal act as such would violate the separation of powers).
98. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that the court must
impose a sentence that the legislature has prescribed upon a finding of guilt).
The Krotzer court cited State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982), in
defining the scope of judicial sentencing authority. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at
254. In Olson, the court examined a statute allowing courts the power to sentence persons without regard to sentencing enhancements for the use of a
firearm. Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 15. The court held that a judicial decision not
to apply the enhancement statute did not require prosecutorial assent, because "once the legislature has prescribed the punishment for a particular offense, it cannot, within constitutional parameters, condition the imposition of
the sentence by the court upon the prior approval of the prosecutor." Id. at
18.
The California case upon which the Olson court rested its description of
broad judicial power is contra to the Supreme Court's decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), and has been abandoned by the Call-
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sentences available upon a felony conviction, including thirddegree criminal sexual conduct, do not include a stay of adjudication. 9 Minnesota Statute § 609.095 expressly limits the dispositions available upon a finding of guilt, providing, "No other
or different sentence or punishment shall be imposed for the
commission of a crime than is authorized by this chapter or
other applicable law." 0 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
provide presumptive sentences for criminal offenses and allow
for departures, but do not authorize a stay of adjudication.'
Neither the Minnesota statutes nor the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines authorized the court's imposition of a conditional
stay of adjudication as a punishment for the crime with which
Krotzer was charged.
Further, the court cannot justify its imposition of a stay of
adjudication as akin to existing sentencing options. Under certain circumstances, Minnesota statutes allow the court to stay
imposition or execution of the sentence on specified conditions,
usually probation. 02 Indeed, given Krotzer's criminal history
score of zero, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines called for a
stay of execution in his case. 1°3 Stays of imposition or execution, however, are fundamentally different from a stay of adjudication. A stay of adjudication precludes a conviction for the
offense charged, whereas a stay of imposition or execution is an
fornia courts. See, e.g., People v. San Diego County Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Furthermore, as Justice Coyne noted
in her dissent, unlike in Olson, the trial court in Krotzer stepped entirely outside the statutory sentencing framework by "creating a diversion for which
there is neither statutory authority nor precedent." Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at
258 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
99. Minnesota Statute § 609.10 (1994) lists as available felony sentences
only imprisonment for a term of years up to life and/or payment of fines, restitution, or fees. In addition, Minnesota Statute § 609.135, subdivision 1 (1994)
provides for a stay of execution or a stay of imposition of a sentence, together
with probation, intermediate sanctions, or both. Special terms of probation
and extended sentences are made available in certain cases. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 609.10, subd. 2-6; 609.135-.166 (1994).
100. Id. § 609.095.
10L See MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES § IV (1996). (establishing a presumptive
sentence of a stayed term of imprisonment for 18 months upon conviction of
Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Third Degree for an individual with a criminal history score of zero); see also supra note 20 (explaining the Sentencing
Guidelines and the process for departure from the guidelines).
102. MINN. STAT. § 609.135, subd. 1 (1994); see also MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES
cmt. IlI.A.101 (1996) ("When the presumptive sentence is a stay, the judge
may grant the stay by means of either a stay of imposition or a stay of execution.") (emphasis added).
103. MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES § IV (1996).
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authorized sentence upon a finding of guilt.1°4 The legislature
has authorized stays of adjudication only when an adult defendant pleads guilty to certain enumerated drug crimes.10 5 The
Krotzer court acknowledged that this authorization was inapplicable, 10 6 but reasoned that it created a basis for the use of a
stay of adjudication.0 7 Such reasoning is inappropriate in the
mandates and the intent
face of explicit legislative sentencing
10 8
to limit judicial discretion therein.
Finally, the court cannot justify its holding under the
statutory authority to dismiss cases in the "furtherance of justice."'0 9 Such an action is not the final order of the court and
does not preclude the State from further pursuing the
charge. 110 The Krotzer court deemed the trial court's disposition as something akin to this authority."' Though the trial
judge may have had such a motive in mind, his holding did not
include a dismissal order by the court, as the statute requires
when a court acts in the "furtherance of justice.""' The Minne104. See Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 866 (noting that the district court
"reserved the formal adjudication of a guilty plea" when it stayed adjudication). The stay of adjudication was indefinite and acted as a final disposition
of the case, though Krotzer was never found guilty of any offense.
105. Minnesota Statute § 152.18 (1994) allows for diversion of some cases
after trial or upon a plea of guilty to fourth- or flfth-degree possession of a
controlled substance. Also, both a statute and the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for stays of adjudication in certain juvenile delinquency
proceedings. M]NN. STAT. § 260.185; M]NN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02.
106. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 254 n.3.
107. See id. at 256 ("We therefore hold that it was not improper for the district court in this case to follow the sentencing options permitted by section
152.18 .... ")

108. See supra note 105 (describing the extent of the diversion statute).
109. Minnesota Statute § 631.21 (1994) states:
The court may order a criminal action, whether prosecuted upon
indictment or complaint, to be dismissed. The court may order dismissal of an action either on its own motion or upon motion of the
prosecuting attorney and in furtherance of justice. If the court dismisses an action, the reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in
the order and entered upon the minutes. The recommendations of
the prosecuting officer in reference to dismissal, with reasons for"
dismissal, must be stated in writing and filed as a public record with
the official files of the case.
110. See supra notes 37, 48 and accompanying text (explaining that a
dismissal by the court is not with prejudice to the prosecution).
111. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 255.
112. MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (1994); see also State v. Kivi, 554 N.W.2d 97,
101 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the "interest ofjustice" power did not
apply to a court's dismissal when its order did not cite § 631.21 or state reasons for dismissal as the statute required).
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sota Supreme Court's implication that the stay of adjudication
precluded further prosecutorial action on the charge refutes its
own conclusion that the trial court had merely entered a dis1 13
missal order.
If the stay of adjudication did indeed serve as an ultimate
disposition of the case, jeopardy attached and the disposition
denied the prosecutor an opportunity to proceed with the
charge in that court or in the future. 114 As such, the stay of
adjudication was not, as the court insisted, "a course of action
short of dismissal,"11 s but rather an impermissible expansion of
the statutory authority granted the judiciary through which
the court precluded any further action by the State.116 The
court's power to dismiss in the furtherance of justice, be it
"inherent" or statutory, does not imply the additional authority
to preclude future prosecution on the same charge. 1 Labeling
the stay a "lesser" judicial act ignores the fact that the
"greater" power does not include the attachment of jeopardy; it
is curious that the Krotzer court found that the stay of adjudication did just that.
If, in the alternative, the stay of adjudication was merely
an indefinite "continuance for dismissal," as the court of appeals implied, 118 the court's action frustrated the prosecutor's
role even more and was more clearly unauthorized. The court
correctly noted that it had the right to delay the proceeding be113. The court noted the holding in City of St. Paul v. Landreville, 221
N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn. 1974), in which the court found that "the court has
the inherent power to dismiss a case in the interest or furtherance of justice,
whether that power is expressly conferred by statute or arises by implication."
Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 255. Regardless, a dismissal under the statute is
without prejudice. In re Welfare of J.H.C., 384 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. 1986).
114. See MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subd. 1 (1994) ("All the offenses, if prosecuted, shall be included in one prosecution which shall be stated in separate
counts."); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (holding that "the
bar to retrial following acquittal or conviction ensures that the State does not
make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing him to
continued embarrassment, anxiety and expense, while increasing the risk of
erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence"); supra note 37
and accompanying text (noting the double jeopardy implications of reinstating
charges after a dismissal with prejudice).
115. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 255.
116. See, e.g., Landreville, 221 N.W.2d at 534 (holding that an attempt to
"permanently" dismiss a case by judicial order, absent a constitutional violation in bringing the charges, was an impermissible overstepping of the cours
authority, either statutory or implied).
117. Id.
118. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d at 866.
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fore accepting a plea or entering judgment, and that such a
delay was proper pending completion of a pre-sentence investigation.'19 An indefinite continuance pending the completion of
a probationary sentence or otherwise, however, would allow
Krotzer to meet the court's conditions and subsequently move
for dismissal for want of prosecution or for a violation of his
right to a speedy trial. 120 The prosecutor was thus temporarily
powerless to pursue any course at all, and the
statute of limi12
tations may have barred future prosecution. 1
Furthermore, judicial suspension of a criminal case without the prosecutor's consent violates the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which require an agreement of all the
parties in order to suspend prosecution."n That the court must
approve such an agreement does not give it authority to make
such an agreement with the defendant and leave the State out
of the decision altogether. 123 The decision to suspend prosecution, like the choice of negotiating a plea to a lesser charge, 124

119. A delay is consistent with the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See, e.g., MINN. R. CmM. P. 14.01 (governing the entry of a plea) and 27.03,
subd. 1 (allowing a continuance for sentencing); see also Ex Parte United
States, 242 U.S. 27, 46 (1916) (noting that it is proper for a criminal court to
delay sentencing and that "many good reasons may be suggested for doing so;
such as to give opportunity for a motion for a new trial or in arrest, or to enable the judge to better satisfy his own mind what the punishment ought to
be") (citation omitted).
120. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972) (noting that in some
situations, an indictment may be dismissed on speedy trial grounds even if a
defendant did not object to continuances).
121. See MINN. STAT. § 628.26(c) (1994) (noting that the statute of limitation when the victim was under the age of 18 is either 3 or 7 years, depending
on various circumstances).
122. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.05, subdivision 1 provides
in part:
(1) Generally. After due consideration of the victim's views and
subject to the court's approval, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant may agree that the prosecution will be suspended for a
specified period after which it will be dismissed under subdivision 7
of this rule on condition that the defendant not commit a felony, gross
misdemeanor, misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor offense during the
period.
123. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the limited judicial role in the decision to terminate prosecution); cf. State v. Aubol, 244
N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that the decision to suspend a prosecution under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.01 is that
of the prosecutor).
124. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (establishing the prosecutorial authority to enter into plea agreements); note 36 (noting that courts
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entails a judicial role of oversight, not instigation.'2 5 Similarly,
the court generally may not accept a plea to a lesser offense
than that charged.'2 6 Though the Minnesota courts may have
wished that the prosecutor had diverted the case from trial on
the charge brought, they lacked the power, by either statute or
rule, to suspend that prosecution or accept a plea to any other
charge than third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
3. The Court's Elimination of the Prosecutor's Legitimate
Function
In issuing a stay of adjudication, the court eliminated the
prosecutor's opportunity to exercise his "absolute right to
prosecute." 2 ' The defendant did not allege, nor did the court
find, that the prosecutor had abused his discretion or violated
128
the state constitution in bringing the charge against Krotzer.
Though the court may have felt that such a charge would unfairly label Krotzer a sex offender, the facts supported the
charge, as Krotzer's actions fell well within the legislature's
definition of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.'2 9 The
State, as the voice of the people, has a "right to one full and fair
may not accept a plea to a lesser charge without the consent of the prosecutor).
125. See, e.g., State v. Vahabi, 529 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that judges should not inject themselves into the process of negotiating a plea).
126. See State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Minn. 1980) (en banc)
(holding that the court has the power to review a prosecution, but not to initiate, suspend or terminate a prosecution). The acceptance of a lesser plea is
akin to making a charging decision-a power which rests solely in the hands
of the prosecutor. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting that a
prosecutor exercises his or her constitutional authority in deciding whether to
bring criminal charges). The power to accept a lesser plea is only appropriate
when the court specifically finds that the greater charge is not supported by
the evidence. Carriere,290 N.W.2d at 620-21.
127. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 408 (Wyo. 1990); see supra note 27
(discussing the scope of the prosecutor's charging authority).
128. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (noting that the
prosecutor's discretion in bringing charges is bounded only by due process).
The trial court's disagreement with the consequences of a conviction under
the statute Krotzer was charged with violating is not the equivalent of a
finding of prosecutorial abuse.
129. Clearly, Krotzer's behavior violated the letter of Minnesota Statute §
609.344, subdivision 1(b). Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record
that the charging decision or the statute itself was arbitrary or discriminative,
the determination of which was the limit of judicial review. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (explaining that conscious selective enforcement is
not unconstitutional as long as the selection is not discriminative).

1997]

INHERENT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

1073

opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws." 130 After the prosecutor made his charging decision, the court had no
authority to control the course of the prosecution.13 . That the
13 2
court felt that a plea agreement would have been suitable
was constitutionally irrelevant. Such an opinion cannot thwart
a legitimate exercise of the prosecutorial133power vested in the
executive by the Minnesota Constitution.
The decision to grant a stay of adjudication in Krotzer imposed a penalty for Krotzer's acts other than the one established by the legislature. 134 The Krotzer court was unable to
justify such a holding in light of the express language of Minnesota statutes and rules. Because the stay of adjudication
functionally precluded the prosecutor from further action on
the charge, the stay amounted to a final disposition.1 35 The
court had no authorization for such a sentence, as the statutes
and sentencing guidelines expressly limited the court's dispo136
sition options.
B. THE EXTENT OF "INHERENT" JUDICIAL POWERS
Despite the trial court's lack of statutory authority to enter
a stay of adjudication, the Krotzer appellate courts upheld the
sentence, concluding that the decision to stay adjudication "fell
within the 'inherent judicial power' we have repeatedly recog13 7
nized, and was necessary to the furtherance of justice." Such
a conclusion, by definition of inherent power, implies that the
decision was "essential to the existence, dignity, and function

130. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984).
131. See supra note 32 (discussing decisions of Minnesota and federal
courts which held that the courts may not unduly interfere with this aspect of
executive authority).
132. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1996).
133. See State v. Aubol, 244 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. 1976) (per curiam)
("The question is not what the judge would do if he were the prosecuting attorney, but whether he can say that the action of the prosecuting attorney is
such a departure from sound prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion.").
134 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the court's limited sentencing options).
135. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text (noting that the
coures action in precluding further prosecution was not within its authority).
136. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing the
Krotzer court's sentencing options).
137. 548 N.W.2d at 255 (citations omitted).
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of [the] court." 138 This reasoning ignores the fact that, although
all the parties need to observe the court's powers of equity and
ministerial oversight of criminal proceedings,'39 the separation
of powers doctrine and the development of presumptive sentencing limit the0 extent of inherent judicial power in the sentencing context.14
Inherent power must respect the separation of powers doctrine, which mandates that the court's legitimate role in criminal cases cannot preclude the other branches from acting pursuant to their respective constitutional authority.' 4 1 Inherent
judicial power essentially "fills in the blanks" when roles are
unclear and justice is the only guide. 42 It has little place in
sentencing because the legislature has the exclusive power to
create punishments and the executive has the exclusive power
to pursue criminal sanctions. 43 The courts may prohibit abuse
138. In re Clerk of Lyon County, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1976); see supra note 55 (explaining the basis of inherent judicial power).
139. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (noting that courts have
inherent power to preserve effective functioning of the criminal justice process).
140. See State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 1982) (noting that "courts
have no inherent authority to impose terms or conditions of sentence for
criminal acts" and that "the power to prescribe punishment for such acts rests
with the legislature"); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 416 (Wyo. 1990) ('The judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed
by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed."); supra note
20 and accompanying text (noting that sentencing guidelines provide judges
with a presumptive range and narrow exceptions in which their discretionary
power is quite limited); see also Hon. William W. Schwarzer, JudicialDiscretion in Sentencing, 159 PRAcTIcING LAw INSTITUTE: CRIM. L. & URB. PROBS.
15, 24 (1991) (noting that the available departures from presumptive sentences "are not held out by the guidelines as opportunities for the exercise of
discretion-rather than being invited to exercise their discretion, judges are
directed to apply [departures] correctly, as the guidelines instruct").
141. See Lyon County, 241 N.W.2d at 786 ("The test [of inherent judicial
authority] must be applied with due consideration for equally important executive and legislative functions.").
142. See id. at 784 (holding that the scope of inherent judicial powers "is
the practical necessity of ensuring the free and fifll
exercise of the coures vital
function-the disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs
and justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial;
promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws.'") (citation omitted).
143. See, e.g., State v. Jonason, 292 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1980) ("Judicial
sentencing must strictly adhere to statutory authorization."); State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978) ("The role of the trial judge in prescribing sentence in a criminal case is that of the executor of the legislative
power."). But see supra note 52 (noting the split between states as to whether
courts have inherent authority to sentence a convicted defendant to less than
the statutory minimum without the prosecutor's consent); note 57 (discussing
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by the other branches, 1" but they may not supersede legislative and prosecutorial judgment when the constitution supports such judgment.' 45
Minnesota statutes and rules also limited the court's inherent powers in disposing of the case.'4 The trial court could
have rejected Krotzer's guilty plea, 147 dismissed the case in the
furtherance of justice, 148 or sentenced Krotzer according to the
149
dictates of the statute under which the State charged him.
Its inherent power entailed that much, but no more.1 50 The
prosecutor could not force its hand,' 5' but the court's powers
included only those cards dealt it by the constitution. Though
the trial judge personally disagreed with the ends sought and
means taken in Krotzer's case,152 it is difficult to see how having to choose a sentencing option from those authorized by
statute threatened the court's existence or dignity. Creating a
new penalty may or may not have furthered justice, but it was
beyond the court's authority to do so.

the expansive scope of judicial sentencing power taken by the New Jersey
courts).
144- Cf. State v. Aubol, 244 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. 1976) (per curiam)
(noting that the court may deny a prosecutor's motion to dismiss a case if the
court specifically finds an abuse of discretion).
145. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 574 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Mass. 1991)
("The district attorney is the people's elected advocate for a broad spectrum of
societal interests-from ensuring that criminals are punished for wrongdoing,
to allocating limited resources to maximize public protection.").
146. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d at 580-81.
147. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining the judicial
power to accept and reject pleas).
148. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining the judicial
power of dismissal).
149. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining judicial sentencing authority).
150. See, e.g., Gordon, 574 N.E.2d at 977 (noting that courts have inherent
authority to dismiss an indictment before or after trial for insufficient evidence, because of unfair presentation of evidence to the grand jury, or for constitutional infirmity, but holding that "[all those powers involve either rulings of law or exercises of discretion after the Commonwealth has had a full
and fair opportunity to present its case" and that "[bly contrast, pretrial dismissal of a lawful complaint prematurely cuts off the prosecution without a
legal basis").
151. See, e.g., State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 1982) (noting that
"we expect too much when we look to the prosecutor alone for an evenhanded
assessment of whether mitigating factors may exist in cases that have been
successfully prosecuted").
152. See supra note 75 (quoting the court in its criticism of the prosecutor).
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C. THE "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
Beyond subverting the separation of powers, the Krotzer
decision left unclear the circumstances under which a stay of
adjudication is proper. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the "special circumstances" of Krotzer's case warranted
the "unusual" disposition levied by the trial court. 53 Those circumstances appear to have been both objective (the lack of aggression and the context of the relationship) and subjective
(the mother's desire to have charges dropped and the court's
disagreement with the choice to prosecute the charge). As
such, the case presents little guidance as to the extent to which
this extraordinary power is available to criminal courts.
Since Krotzer, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reviewed three cases in which trial courts granted stays of adjudication, finding in each that the disposition was available and
proper under the circumstances presented. 154 In State v. Foss,
a trial court stayed adjudication of a man charged with fifthdegree assault.'55 The trial court found that the parties on
both sides of the altercation were guilty of wrongdoing, and
held that the circumstances of the case warranted a stay of
adjudication with a probationary term of six months attached. 56 In upholding the decision, the court of appeals noted
that Krotzer granted
the courts wide discretion in applying
57
such a remedy.

153. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1996).
154. State v. Vahabi, Nos. C7-95-1795, C9-95-1796, 1996 WL 509690
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1996), review granted (Dec. 11, 1996); State v.
Hauer, No. C5-96-249, 1996 WL 495051 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1996); State
v. Foss, 554 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.
1996).
155. Foss, 554 N.W.2d at 83. The State charged Foss for chasing down a
motorist who had made an obscene gesture at him and subsequently grabbing
him by the hair and swearing at him. Id.
156. Id. The defendant was also assessed $100 in court costs. Id.
157. Id. at 84 ("Whatever is included in the term 'special circumstances,' a
narrow definition of that term would be inherently inconsistent with the
broad nature of the 'inherent judicial power' that the Krotzer court recognizes.") (citing Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1996)).
The Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the judgment, however, holding instead that Foss's case was a "typical case of misdemeanor assault" and
noting that "[nlothing in the record supports the conclusion that 'special circumstances' like those in Krotzer were present or that the prosecution in any
way abused its broad discretion in charging the defendant with misdemeanor

assault." State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996). In its brief order
opinion, the supreme court did not clarify the "special circumstances" test, but
did note that the authority under Krotzer should be exercised only when
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The court of appeals' second interpretation of Krotzer occurred in State v. Hauer,in which the State charged the defendant with wrongfully obtaining welfare benefits. 5 8 The trial
court refused to accept the defendant's guilty plea, stayed adjudication, and placed her on probation for one year.15 9 The
"special circumstances" that the court found compelling included the facts that the defendant had completed counseling,
paid restitution, and would lose her education grants if convicted of a felony) 60 The court also noted that the amount
taken was "barely over felony level," and that avoidance
of a
161
felony record would be "critical to Hauer's future."
Similarly, in State v. Vahabi, the court upheld a stay of
adjudication in another case of wrongfully obtaining public assistance. 62 The trial court ordered restitution and imposed
probation and a fine, noting that the defendants would be deported if convicted and that the State would be denied an opportunity for restitution. 63 The court noted that the case
lacked mitigating factors, but found that the collateral consequences of conviction were "severe."" The court held that the
circumstances of the case were different "in kind" from
Krotzer's, but that the
"special circumstances" were "within the
165
rationale of Krotzer."
These three cases indicate two disturbing consequences of
Krotzer: courts are virtually unconstrained in their exercise of
the "inherent power" to stay adjudication, and such stays are
likely to become commonplace. 66 The "special circumstances"
"injustice results] from the prosecutor's abuse of discretion in the exercise of
the charging function." Id.
158. Hauer, 1996 WL 495051, at *1. The defendant pled guilty to fraudulently obtaining $282 in food stamp benefits and $515 in AFDC benefits. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The defendant's attorney also requested a stay of adjudication so
that the defendant could continue to receive public assistance, which allowed
her to continue to attend school. Id.
161. Id. at *2.
162. State v. Vahabi, Nos. C7-95-1795, C9-95-1796, 1996 WL 509690, at * 2
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1996).
163. Id. Restitution of $21,453 was ordered as well as a $100 fine and 0 to
3 years probation. Id. Apparently, the court did not see the small amount of
funds taken in Hauer as a distinguishing factor in this case, in which the
fraud was much more invidious and lasted for years.
164. It is unclear whether the court focused its concern on the potential for
deportation faced by the defendants or the possibility that the State may not
have a chance to gain restitution. Id. at *2.
165. Id.
166. See State v. Foss, 544 N.W.2d 82, 85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (Harten,
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test, as applied by the court of appeals, amounts to a balancing
test of the gravity of the offense, the severity of the concomitant consequences of conviction to the particular defendant,
and the collateral ends sought by the State. The test ignores
the value choices the legislature made in creating the criminal
code--both deterrent and retributivist. 167 Although those
choices are imbedded in the sentencing provisions provided by
statutes and guidelines, it appears from these decisions that a
finds that an alternacourt may ignore them if it subjectively
68
tive disposition would further justice.
That the court of appeals has upheld stays of adjudication
in cases of sexual abuse, 169 violence,170 and theft 171 indicates
that stays of adjudication are likely to be exercised regardless
of the category of crime with which the State charges a defendant. So long as a defendant can convince the court that the
J., dissenting) ("With no clear restrictions and a willing judiciary, inherent
power stays of adjudication could become routinely administered, and, despite
the prosecutor's objection, the executive function thereby routinely subjugated
in the name of expedience.").
167. For instance, the statute under which the State charged Krotzer specifically states that consent by the victim is not a defense, making it apparent
that the legislature specifically discounted consent as a factor relating to the
seriousness of the crime. MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. (1)(b) (1996). The
Krotzer court subverted this judgment when it took into account C.H.M.'s consent to the sexual relationship as a "special circumstance" which allowed for a
stay of adjudication.
168. But compare People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 378 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted), noting:
The power to define crimes and prescribe punishment is a legislative
function. The judiciary may not interfere in this process unless the
statute prescribes a penalty so severe in relation to the crime as to
violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.... The basic test is whether the punishment is "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity."
It is doubtful that any court would find that the penalties faced by
Krotzer, Foss, Hauer, or the Vahabis were cruel and unusual. None of the defendants made such an argument, for which they carried the burden of establishing the disproportionality of the sentence as compared to the seriousness
of the crime. Id. at 379. As noted by the Supreme Court, "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly
rare." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
169. Krotzer was charged with "statutory rape," which Minnesota Statute
§ 609.344 defines as "sexual abuse."
170. Fifth-degree assault, with which the State charged Foss, is a crime of
violence under Minnesota Statute § 609.224, subdivision 1 (1994).
171. The State charged both the Vahabis and Hauer with theft by wrongfully obtaining public assistance, a violation of Minnesota Statute § 256.98,
subdivision 1 (1994).
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collateral consequences of conviction are severe compared to
the actual harm done, the court can issue a stay and effectively
preclude the State from prosecuting the defendant's wrongdoing."
That criminal penalties are "critical" to a defendant's
future 17 3 is exactly the basis of criminal law,174 however, and
reflects the judgment that the state constitution entitles the
legislature to make. 75 The court's subjective application of
stays of adjudication creates unlimited potential for abuse of
judicial discretion, 17 6 destroys the uniformity that the sentencing guidelines seek, and177undermines public confidence in the
criminal justice system.
The criminal justice system has many goals, but it must
retain the support of the populace in order to remain effective.
Dissatisfaction with the inconsistency of indeterminate, individualized sentencing has driven the trend in sentencing toward uniform penalties.17 The sentencing guidelines take into
account characteristics of individual offenders and their crimes
to determine an appropriate penalty. 79 The court, therefore,

172. Courts may find a stay of adjudication particularly fitting in drunk
driving cases, in which an offender is subject to license revocation, social
stigma, and huge financial costs even when there is no "victim." It would appear that a court could exercise its "inherent power" to lessen the blow to the
defendant if it is convinced that such an outcome is "just"under the circumstances.
173. State v. Hauer, No. C5-96-249, 1996 WL 495051, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 3, 1996).
174 See id. (Harten, J., dissenting) ("Anyone convicted of a crime must
deal with the personal effects of the conviction.").
175. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
authority to define crime).
176. See State v. Vahabi, Nos. C7-95-1975, C9-95-1796, 1996 WL 509690,
at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1996) (Harten, J., dissenting) ("Krotzer is read
to allow unrestrained exercise of inherent judicial power-a power traditionally immune from remedy by both the legislative and the executive branches
of government.").
177. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685
(1992) (noting that the federal sentencing guidelines were a response to widespread dissatisfaction with sentencing disparities and the uncertainty that
indeterminate sentencing created); Schwarzer, supra note 140, at 18 ("The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was adopted in response to a widespread feeling that unwarranted disparities in sentencing were undermining public faith
in the criminaljustice system.").
178. McCall, supra note 21, at 483-84.
179. See supra note 20 (describing the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines,
which establish a grid system based on the offender's criminal history and the
seriousness of the crime of which he or she has been convicted).
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must fully explain departures from presumptive sentences
based on "substantial and compelling" factors of the individual
case."' ° Krotzer and its progeny, however, did not offer such an
explanation. In failing to do so, they created disparate sentences and undermined public confidence that the system will
treat those who break the law similarly.''
D. A LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE: LIMITED APPLICATION
Despite the problems created by the "special circumstances" test, the fact remains that presumptive sentences may
not fit the crime or the criminal in every instance in which
courts must apply them.8 2 If a stay of adjudication is to become an available judicial device to address this issue, it is the
legislature that needs to clearly define the scope and availability of that disposition alternative.8 3 The Minnesota legislature
has shown a willingness to do so, and perhaps has gone as far
as it is willing to go in allowing this extraordinary measure.'8
Nonetheless, Krotzer necessitates that the legislature must act
or have its power to limit judicial sentencing
discretion sub85
sumed by "inherent judicial authority."
The legislature, exercising its exclusive power to adopt
criminal law, encapsulates the will of the people in deciding
how punishments will be meted out. The democratic legislative process serves as the filter through which the public voices
its value judgment and the means by which the criminal justice system gains its legitimacy.'86 The power to define crimi-

MINN. SENT. GUIDELINES § II.D (1996).
18L See Schwarzer, supra note 140, at 18-19 (noting that Congress, in enacting the federal sentencing guidelines, "reasoned that to promote public
faith in the criminal justice system, the public needed to believe that similar
offenders who committed the same crime under similar circumstances did not
receive substantially different punishment").
182. See id. at 23 (criticizing the result of the federal sentencing guidelines, and noting that "[bly taking discretion from the judge to consider factors
that are critical to making a sentence reasonable and appropriate for the case,
the guidelines open the door to arbitrary results," and that "[i]t is useful to
remember that it is an offender, not an offense, who is being punished").
183. See State v. Olson, 324 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 1982) (noting that the
power to "nol pros" belongs solely to the prosecutor absent statutory provisions to the contrary).
184 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that a stay of adjudication is only available by statute in enumerated drug crimes).
185. See supra notes 153-165 (detailing cases in which Krotzer has been
found to give expansive judicial authority).
186. See, e.g., State v. United Parking Stations, 50 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Minn.
180.
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nal acts necessarily includes the authority to determine how
the State will react to their commission." 7 While it must face
the realities of an overcrowded and costly prison system and a
political climate that discourages balanced crime measures, the
legislature remains the forum through which the citizenry
makes value choices and from which democracy doles out the
powers to bring the weight of the people's decisions to bear.
It is arguable that judges sit in the best position to evaluate the "best" disposition of each individual case. They are able
to evaluate all of the facts of a case from a detached.viewpoint,
apart from the politicization of crime. 188 In addition, judges see
countless criminal cases and develop the capacity to comparatively evaluate the aggravating and mitigating factors involved
in a given case.8 9 Thus, although judges face the pressures of
an enormous caseload and an increasing presence in the public
eye, they remain as the sole face of humanity in the decision to
take away an individual's liberty.'
The separation of powers doctrine, however, enjoins the
judiciary from interfering with the legislature in its capacity to
determine what acts will result in punishment by the State,
and how far that punishment will extend. 191 Despite the need
for the branches to work together in the criminal justice system, and regardless of any possible judicial "expertise," case
law makes it clear that authority expressly granted by the legislature limits the exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing aspect of criminal adjudication.'9 2 The Krotzer decision
1951) (noting that the debate over the wisdom and propriety of exercises of
the police power necessarily must take place in the legislative body, not the

courts).
187. State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978).
188. United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd
sub nom. United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
189. See id. (noting that the role of judges is to use their "accumulated experience, judgment, and, hopefully, wisdom" in deciding criminal sentences).
190. Daniel J. Freed noted:
Each case involves unique offenders and offense circumstances, and
their underlying stories-of need or greed, of recklessness or malice,
in mitigation or aggravation-need to be assessed and sentenced by
experienced professionals exercising human judgment. Numerical
"offense levels" are useful in launching the sentencing process, but
they are woefully unreliable as substitutes for judges.
Freed, supra note 177, at 1705.
19L See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing the authority of the legislature to set criminal penalties).
192. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting the limits of judicial
sentencing powers).
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abridged the exclusive reservation of the authority to determine sentencing options and took the notion
of "inherent judi193
cial power" beyond its constitutional limits.
If the legislature chooses to consider the issue and grant
courts the option of imposing a stay of adjudication, it must
carefully determine the instances in which that power may be
exercised. Indeed, in allowing such a disposition in certain
drug possession cases 94 and in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 195 the legislature has shown a willingness to allow judges
to stay adjudication when the prosecutor agrees that utilitarian concerns outweigh the need for seeking the harsh penalties
provided by the sentencing guidelines.
In considering a model for a "stay of adjudication" statute,
the legislature may look towards the statutes that permit dismissal in the furtherance of justice, 196 diversion in juvenile delinquency cases, 197 or diversion in drug cases. 19 The "furtherance of
justice" statute appears from the Krotzer opinions to be a suitable guide, but careful examination shows that it would be an
inappropriate model. The Krotzer decision makes it seem as
though the power to stay adjudication is the rough equivalent
of the power to dismiss a case in the furtherance of justice. 199
The statute that establishes the latter is quite broad in its allowance of judicial discretion."' Moreover, the interpretation
that such a dismissal is without prejudice is the key to its constitutionality, as it would otherwise infringe upon the prosecu193. See, for example, Commonwealth v. Kindness, 371 A.2d 1346, 1350
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), which held that in exercising its power to divert cases
from trial, the court was
limited to working within the existing framework of separation of
powers, and therefore could not create a diversion program without
requiring prosecutorial initiative, as the Commonwealth is indisputably a litigant and possesses a substantive right to insist on
seeking a conviction.... While there is something to be said for allowing a court to overrule a prosecutor and order diversion, it should
be said to the General Assembly.
194. MINN. STAT. § 152.18 (1996).
195. Id. § 260.185.
196. Id. § 631.21.
197. Id. § 260.185. Because the special needs and goals of adjudication of
juveniles are not present in adult criminal trials, the juvenile delinquency di'version statute does not serve as a useful guide in the adult prosecution context.
198. Id. § 152.18.
199. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text (detailing the court's
reasoning).
200.

MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (1996).
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tor's legitimate exercise of the power to bring criminal
charges. 201 Because a stay of adjudication may not allow such
future prosecutorial action, °2 the creation of a statute similar
to the "furtherance of justice" authorization would fail to recognize the constitutional separation of powers and would destroy the long-recognized power of the executive to control
prosecution.2 0 3
The diversion statute applicable in some drug possession
cases, on the other hand, serves as a useful model for any future enlargement of the power to go outside the usual sentencing framework. The statute establishes exactly which crimes
fall within its scope,204 thereby embodying the legislature's
value judgment in limiting judicial application of its authority.
Diversion from adjudication is not available under this statute
to offenders who have previously received a diverted disposition or have been previously convicted of a controlled substance
violation,0 5 thus retaining the deterrent effect of the threat of
criminal sanctions. The statute also provides that such a disposition is available only "after trial or upon a plea of guilty,"
so that a violation of the diversion conditions may lead directly
to an imposition of the sentence originally available.20 6 The
State keeps a record of the proceeding which it may use in subsequent proceedings, but the offender may apply for20expunge7
ment after completing the conditions of the diversion.
A "stay of adjudication" statute should include each of
these elements. It must specifically state which violations fall
within its scope. 08 Such a limiting measure is critical in maintaining the legislative role in determining which criminal ac201. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that a dismissal

under the statute must be without prejudice).
202. State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1996).
203. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text (detailing the extent of

prosecutorial discretion).
204. See MINN. STAT. § 152.18, subd. 1 (1996) (allowing diversion only for
cases in which the defendant was found guilty of fourth- or fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance).

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 152.18, subd. 3.
208. The choice of which crimes for which a stay of adjudication is available must be the result of legislative deliberation, and this Comment does not
suggest which types of cases are appropriate for such a disposition other than
to suggest that the statute under which Krotzer was charged is inappropriate
for such a disposition. See supra note 92 (explaining the basis for the statutory rape law).
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tivities are so serious as to require sentencing under the existing framework despite any characteristics specific to the incident at hand. A new statute should also limit its application to
first-time offenders so that repeat offenders do not find it fruitful to appeal to judges based on their unique personal circumstances. It should be available only after a finding of guilt so
that offenses need not be retried upon a failure to meet the
conditions of the stay, and the State must keep a record of the
adjudication in order to facilitate future proceedings against
the individual if they arise. An expungement provision, therefore, is necessary so that the statute meets the purpose of the
stay of adjudication-restoring the parties to their original
209
status.
Unless the courts overturn Krotzer or limit the authority it
grants, the legislature should act to stem the judicial discretion
the case granted. Such a legislative reaction is within its constitutional role of defining criminal behavior and sanctions,
and is necessary to preserve the structure established by the
separation of powers.
CONCLUSION
The decision in State v. Krotzer abandoned precedent and
constitutional law. The holding that "stay of adjudication" was
within the "inherent judicial power" subverted the constitutional prerogatives of the legislature to define criminal conduct
and set penalties, and of the prosecutor to bring charges based
on his or her discretion. Additionally, the decision was contrary to Minnesota statutes and Rules of Criminal Procedure
and unsupported by prior decisions as to the scope of judicial
authority. The court went beyond its constitutional role in
making its judgment based on subjective values rather than
exercising the limited sentencing authority that statutes and
the constitution had granted it. The decision further established a standard allowing virtually unlimited judicial discretion in sentencing and threatened to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. The Minnesota Supreme
Court should overturn its decision in Krotzer and restore the
delicate balance of powers in the criminal justice system.
It may be apparent that in some cases a stay of adjudication is proper in the interest of justice. It is, however, for the
legislature to define those instances and grant such an ex209. MINN. STAT. § 152.18, subd. 3 (1996).
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traordinary power to the courts. If it chooses to do so, it should
carefully limit the availability of a stay of adjudication as an
option to the court to circumstances in which such a disposition
does not defeat the purposes of criminal prosecution or inhibit
the other branches from exercising their constitutional discretion. The separation of powers and the integrity of the criminal justice system demand as much.

